Voluntary manslaughter has been a popular plea or verdict in several recent local trials.
David Christian will plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter on Sept. 25. He is charged with second-degree murder for allegedly killing his friend, Michael Steward, while the two were drinking alcohol and playing chess in October 2008.
Peter Persaud, a public defender representing Christian, is the same attorney who represented Curtis Fry in his trial this spring.
Also originally charged with second-degree murder, Fry was convicted of voluntary manslaughter on April 3 after a bench trial. Sixth District Judge Mitchell Turner sentenced Fry to 10 years in prison, the maximum sentence for voluntary manslaughter.
What sets voluntary manslaughter apart from second-degree murder, said UI law Professor David Baldus, is the element of provocation. Essentially, he said, it is a killing that would be considered second-degree murder — murder without the element of premeditation — unless there is sufficient provocation.
Christian allegedly killed Steward during a physical confrontation. He told police that he put Steward’s head between his legs and squeezed until Steward stopped breathing; every time he attempted to release his friend, he said, Steward attempted to hit him.
While the statute is clear about the differentiation, several words remain vague.
The Iowa Code states voluntary manslaughter occurs “if the person causing the death acts solely as the result of sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a person.”
But what exactly constitutes “serious provocation,” is left to the judge’s discretion, Baldus said.
Likewise, when the statute says the person must act immediately after provocation, before a “person of ordinary reason and temperament would regain control.” It is up to the judge to determine when that point is.
Voluntary manslaughter is similar to second-degree murder in the element of intent. In both cases, the perpetrator intends to kill the victim. The question is whether he or she was provoked.
And provocation can apply in many instances.
In Fry’s case, the judge determined that Fry thought he was in his own home when he beat 75-year-old Patrick McEwen to death after a night out of drinking. His reaction to what he perceived was a stranger in his bedroom, the judge ordered, was reasonable given the provocation.
Persaud told the DI after the April 3 ruling in Fry’s case that he sensed voluntary manslaughter when Turner began reading his verdict.
“It was the language in the ruling,” Persaud said. “He talked about [Fry] acting with passion.”
Persaud and Quint Meyerdirk, Fry’s attorneys, contended he attacked McEwen because he believed the elderly man was an intruder. In his ruling, Turner said a sober man would act with the same passion if he felt an intruder were attacking him.
If someone kills a person who had just attacked him or her, the assault may be sufficient provocation.
In these cases, pleading not guilty due to self-defense is typically not an option due to a lack of immediate danger. But the judge may deem that the attack was sufficient provocation to constitute voluntary manslaughter — not murder.
